UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT

THE STATE AND THE CULTURE OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: UNVEILING THE REAL TERRORISTS

An Inaugural Lecture

By

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DEDICATION

This lecture is dedicated to my parents of blessed memory: Late Chief Ernest Gaga Alapiki and Mrs Mercy Alapiki. Both parents told their son (Henry) that the greatest gift they can bestow on him is not riches nor material possession, but good “EDUCATION”.

Late Chief Ernest Gaga Alapiki and Mrs Mercy Alapiki

With good education, a child will grow and survive under any conditions because education liberates the mind and provides a key to open the doors of success. Papa and Mama journeyed to the great beyond 17 years and 3 years ago, respectively.

They will miss this occasion, but I know that they are happy and feel fulfilled, as they watch from the great beyond how the “boy has become the father of the man”.

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Let me begin by giving thanks to God Almighty for His grace and blessings in my life. With God all things are possible. I am grateful for the spiritual guidance of the MAHANTA, the Living ECK Master and divine spirit, the ECK in my life. I have learnt from the Mahanta that “abundance flourishes in a grateful heart”.

To my dear wife Olayemi Alapiki, my children – Martha, Henry Jnr, Princewill and Princess, I say thank you for giving me invaluable joy and love of God-inspired family life.

To my teachers from Akinima State School, Akinima, to Stella Maris College, Harbour road, Port Harcourt and unique University of Port Harcourt, I say Thank You. My journey to the zenith of the knowledge industry to become a professor would not have been possible without the invaluable work of silent labourers (teachers) in a very noble profession.

I remain very grateful also to my colleagues and friends, in the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt. Some were my teachers in the good old days when Uniport was more than “unique”. Thank you for the collegiate spirit and detribalized attitude in our great Faculty. Thank you for giving me the opportunity and privilege to serve you as the first alumnus of the Faculty to be elected to the exalted office of Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences. Thank you for the honor and confidence reposed in me.

May I now thank the managers of the University of Port Harcourt. First is the 7th Vice-Chancellor, Professor Joseph Ajienka, a gentleman with a good heart. To members of his
team – professors E Nduka and Igho Joe, Mrs Matilda Nnodim, Mr Aliezi and other principal officers, I say thank you. Our former Vice-Chancellors – Professors N.D Briggs and Don Baridam, thank you. Mr Mark Roman and Engenni community in Uniport, I say thank you.

To members of ECKANKAR community in Uniport, your support and friendship has been invaluable. You are a special family to me.

Lastly, I thank my special friends - the great students of unique Uniport and my numerous guests, who have come to honor me at this occasion. I remain ever grateful to all because I am the reason you have gathered here.
I pray for long life and prosperity to all. Better days are coming.
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PREAMBLE

Vice Chancellor Sir,
I am humbled and highly honored to be invited to deliver the University’s 117th Inaugural Lecture to express my thoughts and vision of a better Nigerian Society where peace and development would thrive beyond the chains of terror and bad governance. As a Social Scientist and Professor of Political Science, I make bold to say that “unless we get the politics of our country right -by conducting public affairs strictly on the basis of the rule of law, economic development, public morality, peace, justice and equity will remain in chains and the people will remain in bondage”.

Living in bondage is a state of subjection to force, power or influence beyond your control. The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines it as:

“The state of being under the control of a force or influence or abstract power, e.g. “he was in bondage to fear”; he sought release from his bondage to negative and evil powers”

In a society where the citizens live in bondage, they will evidently lack political freedom, liberty, basic social services and absence of fundamental human rights.

This will be so if and when the views and interests of the masses do not count. In such a case, those who “capture” power act like demi-gods and govern in a reckless and ruthless manner, unmindful of a probable backlash.

Where the above scenario exists, you find the absence of the rule of law as the dominant guiding principle of governance. In such circumstances, the judiciary is likely to be in a state of near comatose. The result is the enthronement of the “culture of impunity” at all levels of governance. It is common knowledge that culture is the way of life of a people. Hence, where impunity becomes the dominant feature of a political culture of a society, the
citizens – as individuals and groups, tendentially resort to lawlessness and self-help; where obedience to the law is weak, individuals become laws unto themselves. Brute force and terror become weapons of choice for those who want to exercise power over others. If and when this state of affairs becomes a common feature of a society, then the “commonwealth” has regressed back to what the political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, referred to as the “state of nature”, a condition where “everyman has the liberty to do anything he thinks necessary to preserve his life. In such a society, life will be ‘solitary’, poor, nasty brutish and short”.

Mr Vice Chancellor and distinguished audience, in these circumstances, it does not require native intelligence to see the link between the “culture of impunity” and the “culture of terrorism”. It is in the light of the foregoing necessary precursory that I have chosen the title of this inaugural lecture as: “The State and The Culture of Terrorism in Nigeria: Unveiling the Real Terrorists”. In the discussions that follow, we shall seek to answer the following questions:

♦ Who is a terrorist?
♦ What are the causes of terrorism?
♦ How and why is the state the key actor in terrorism in Nigeria?
♦ How can we win the war against terrorism?
♦ What is the way forward?

This lecture shall be presented in four parts. First, is the introduction and conceptualization of terrorism. Secondly, we shall highlight the nature and character of the Nigerian state and the tendential recourse to terrorism. Thirdly, we shall examine the rise of domestic terrorism in Nigeria and its causes and effects. The fourth section shall be devoted to finding the way forward.

INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is perhaps the most challenging problem of our time nationally and internationally. For some of us, the effect of terrorism may not have hit home yet, having not suffered at the hands of terrorists or living in the hope that terrorist activities will not come
to your area or region. If you hope and think in this manner, you may be living in a fool’s paradise. Can anyone say for sure that “he is safe from terrorism because of distance”? I hope not. The world has become a global village, and it does not matter anymore which part of the world you live in. The unfortunate reality is that terrorism has gone global and every citizen of this world is equally susceptible and vulnerable. Every time you travel by air, bus, train or gather in a public event, you can’t help wondering at the back of your mind, the possibility that anything is possible. The world has lost its innocence, not that there was much innocence earlier, but whatever there was, none seems to exist now.

So what do we do? Should we resign ourselves to the fact that terrorism cannot be fought with? Or that there is no solution to terrorism? Well, I believe that there are possible solutions that we can look at. To begin, however, we need to understand what causes terrorism. From this perspective, we can then focus part of our efforts to dealing with the instigating variables which promote terrorism.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
There is neither an academic nor an international legal consensus regarding the definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Various governments and agencies adopt different definitions. The difficulties, which occasion the reluctance to formulate a common legally binding definition, emanate from the fact that the term is politically and emotionally charged.

Definitional issues are matters of pragmatism and fruitfulness. In the non-scholarly analysis of terrorism, they often become emotional items structured in the we-and-them perceptive prism. Those who enjoy our sympathy are called “freedom fighters”, while the “enemy” groups are terrorists and criminals. In a similar vein, people sometimes call self-styled freedom fighters terrorists if they do not have the support of the population that they claim to speak for (Richardson, 2007:32). It is because the term terrorism is so loaded with conceptual problems that a generally accepted definition of it
still does not exist. Below is a list of definitions of terrorism by some of the most distinguished scholars and institutions on the matter.

♦ The US Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological”.

♦ The UN General Assembly (Resolution 49/60) describes terrorism as: “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public”

♦ The Arab Convention for the suppression of terrorism defines it as: “any act or threat of violence that occurs in the advancement of a criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty and security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public and public institutions and property”.

♦ The UN Security Council (Resolution 1566) (2004) defines terrorism as: “criminal acts, including acts against civilians committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to abstain from taking action against terror”.

♦ Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988) define terrorism as “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.

♦ Alexander Yonah (1976) aptly defined terrorism as: “the use of violence against random civilian targets in order to intimidate or to create generalized pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals”.


Deduced from the definitions above, we can conclude that terrorism is:

1. A specific type of violence. It can be international or domestic.
2. It is perpetuated mainly against civilians.
3. It is a planned and calculated action. The selection of a target is neither spontaneous nor random.
4. Terrorism is motivated by political, religious, ideological and socio-economic objectives.
5. It is action intended to produce fear i.e. a psychological act conducted for its impact on an audience.

**TYPES OF TERRORISM**

Terrorism is classified or categorized differently by different scholars and institutions. One classification shows 5 different types of terrorism thus: nationalists, religious, state-sponsored, left wing and right wing terrorism.

a) Nationalist Terrorists seek to form separate state for their own national group, often by drawing attention to a fight or struggle for national liberation” that they think the world has ignored. Nationalist terrorism can sometimes be difficult to define since many groups accused of terrorism and brutality insist that they are not terrorists but freedom fighters.

b) Religious terrorists seek to use violence to further what they see as divinely commanded purposes, often targeting broad categories of foes in an attempt to bring about sweeping changes. Nearly half of the 28 known active international terrorist groups were religiously motivated. (see list below)

c) State-sponsored terrorist groups are organizations deliberately used or supported by radical states as foreign policy tools. It is a cost-effective way of waging war covertly, through the use of surrogate warriors. Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Libya (under late Gadhafi) are states frequently accused of sponsoring foreign terrorist organizations.

d) Left-wing terrorism –these are groups which aim to destroy capitalism and replace it with a communist or socialist regime. Because they claim to be “protectors” of the suffering masses, left-wing terrorists limit their use of violence to avoid hurting
the civilians. Instead, they focus on such tactics as kidnapping business tycoons, government officials and symbolic bombing of strategic targets.

e) Right-wing terrorist are often associated with neo-Nazi street rioting in Western Europe and parts of Eastern Europe. They are often dominated by skinheads who seek to do away with liberal democratic governments and create fascist states in their place. Neo-fascist groups frequently attack immigrants and refugees from developing countries. They are mainly racists and anti-Semitic.

Below is the outline of selected international terrorist attacks:

1. **January 24, 1975 – New York:** Bomb set-off in historical Fraunces Tavern killed and injured more than 50 persons. Puerto Rican nationalist group claimed responsibility and police tied 13 other bombings to it.

2. **April 18, 1983 – Beirut, Lebanon:** US embassy is destroyed in a suicide car-bomb attack; 63 dead.

3. **October 23, 1983 – Beirut, Lebanon:** Shiite suicide bombers exploded trucks near US military barracks at Beirut airport, killing 241 Marines, minutes later, a second bomb killed 58 French paratroopers in their barracks in West Beirut.

4. **June 14, 1985 – Beirut, Lebanon:** Athens to Rome TWA Flight 847 was forced to fly to Beirut by gunmen apparently connected to Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim terrorist group in Lebanon. The group demanded the release of 700 prisoners in Lebanon and Israel. During the standoff, US Navy diver, Robert Stethem, was executed and his body tossed from the plane onto the runway. The 17-day crisis ended when the hijackers flew to Algiers and released the hostages.

5. **June 23, 1985 – Off Coast of Ireland:** Air India Boeing 747 exploded over the Atlantic as a result of a terrorist-planted bomb. All 329 aboard were killed. Sikh separatist group was thought to be responsible.

6. **December 21, 1988 – Lockerbie, Scotland:** N.Y-bound Pan-Am Boeing 747 exploded in flight from a terrorist bomb and crashed into Scottish village, killing all 259 aboard and 11 on
the ground. Passengers included 35 Syracuse University students and many US military personnel. Two Libyan intelligence officers were tried under Scottish law in The Hague; only one, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Meghrahi, was found guilty in January 2001 (after 13 years protracted trial).

7. **February 26, 1993 – New York City:** Bomb exploded in basement of World Trade Centre; killing six and injuring at least 1040 others. Six Middle Eastern men were later convicted in this act of vengeance for Palestinian people. They claimed to be retaliating against U.S support for Israeli government.

8. **January 1995 – Manila, Philippines:** When a bomb exploded accidentally in a Manila apartment, police uncovered a major terrorist plot. Associates of Osama bin Laden had planned to blow up 12 planes as they flew from South East Asia to U.S, crash another aircraft into CIA headquarters, and to kill the pope. This plot appears to be the “seed” of 9/11 attack in 2001).

9. **April 19, 1995 – Oklahoma City:** truck bomb exploded outside federal office building, collapsing walls and floors. 168 persons were killed, including 19 children and one person who died in rescue effort. Over 200 buildings were destroyed. Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were later convicted in the anti-government plot to avenge the Branch Davidian standoff in Waco, Texas, exactly two years earlier.

10. **March, 1995 – Tokyo, Japan:** members of Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese cult, released sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway, killing 12 and wounding over 3500.

11. **June 25, 1996 – Dharan, Saudi Arabia:** truck bomb exploded outside Khoba Towers military complex, killing 19 American servicemen and injuring hundreds of others. Thirteen Saudis and a Lebanese all alleged members of Islamic militant group, Hezbollah, were indicted in June 2001 on charges relating to the attack (after 5 years of trial).

12. **August 7, 1998 – Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar el Salaam, Tanzania:** truck bombs exploded almost simultaneously near two U.S embassies, killing 224 (213 in Kenya and 11 in Tanzania), and injuring about 4500. Four men, two of whom had received training at al-Qaeda camps inside Afghanistan, were
convicted of the killings in May 2001 and later sentenced to life in Prison. A federal grand jury had indicted 22 men in connection with the attacks, including Saudi dissident, Osama bin Laden.

13. **December, 1999 - Canada:** authorities arrested an Algerian trying to enter the U.S from Canada and foiled a Millennium Terror plot to detonate a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport in the days before January 1, 2000.

14. **October 12, 2000 – Aden, Yemen:** U.S Navy destroyer USS Cole was heavily damaged when a small boat loaded with explosives blew up alongside it. Seventeen sailors were killed in what was apparently a deliberate terrorist attack. Prime suspect thought to be Osama bin Laden, or members of his al-Qaeda terrorist network.

15. **September 11, 2001 – New York City and Arlington V.A:** American Airlines Boeing 767 and United Airlines Boeing 767, both en route Boston to Los Angeles were hijacked and flown only minutes apart into the north and south towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City. Shortly afterwards, American Airlines Boeing 757, en route from Washington DC to Los Angeles, crashed into the Pentagon. A fourth hijacked plane operated by United and headed for Newark from San Francisco crashed in a field in Shanks Ville, PA. Both World Trade Centre towers collapsed, and a section of the Pentagon was destroyed. All 266 passengers and crew aboard the planes were killed; total dead and missing numbered about 3263. The names of the 19 hijackers, four of whom have been connected with terrorist Osama bin Laden, were released in mid-September, 2011.

**LIST OF MAJOR TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS**
Below is a list of major terrorist organizations in the world.

1. Liberation of Tigers or Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka
2. Mujahedin-E-Khalq Organization, Worldwide
3. National Liberation Army, Colombia
4. Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction, Middle East
5. Popular Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction, Middle East
6. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Israel, Syria, Lebanon
7. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt
8. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Colombia
9. Revolutionary Organization 17 November, Greece
10. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, Turkey
11. Revolutionary People’s Struggle, Greece
12. Shining Path, Peru
13. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, Peru
14. Abu Nidal Organization, Middle East, Asia
15. Abu Sayyaf Group, Philippines
16. Al-Qaeda Worldwide
17. Armed Islamic Group, Algeria, France
18. Aum Shinrikyo, Japan, Russia
19. Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Spain
20. Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya, Egypt
21. Hamas, Israel, Occupied Territories, Jordan
22. Harakat UI-Mujahedin, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Pakistan
23. Hizballah, Lebanon
24. Japanese Red Army, Possibly in Lebanon
25. Al-Jihad, Egypt
26. Kach, Israel, West Bank
27. Kahane Chai, Israel, West Bank
28. Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Turkey, Europe

DOMESTIC TERRORISM
Domestic Terrorism involves groups or individuals, who are based and operate within the territories of a country without foreign direction and whose acts are directed at target and elements of the government and civilian population. Domestic terrorist groups can be classified as:

a) Right-wing terrorist groups who adhere to the principles of racial supremacy and embrace anti-government, anti-regulatory beliefs. Generally, extremist right-wing groups engage in activity that is protected by constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly.
b) Left-wing domestic terrorists generally profess a revolutionary (radical) ideology and view themselves as protectors of the people against the dehumanizing effects of capitalism and imperialism.

c) Special Interest terror groups seek to influence specific issues rather than effect widespread political change. They conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force segments of the society, including the general public to change attitude about issues considered important to their causes. For example, the assaults and murders of doctors, who perform abortions under the law in some countries, fall under special interest terrorism.

In summary, domestic terrorism is expressed in activities, which have the following characteristics:

a) Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate law and order
b) Acts intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to threaten and affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping or sabotage of key public interest facilities
c) Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the country in question.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

International terrorism is defined in nearly identical way, except that it occurs or transcends national boundaries and enjoys foreign influence, support and partnership. International terrorism also differs from domestic terrorism in terms of means and network through which their acts are accomplished, the persons or targets they intend to intimidate or coerce, the scale in which their perpetrators operate and the symbolic high profile targets chosen for attacks.

STATE TERRORISM

Governments, international organizations, private institutions and some scholars believe that the term terrorism is only applicable to actions of violent non-state actors. To this, I disagree. They argue that, at best, states might use terrorism as proxy warfare in their
foreign policy. In other circumstances, States play host to terrorist groups and provide invaluable support. Democratic regimes may foster state terrorism of populations outside their borders or perceived as alien but they do not terrorize their own populations because a regime that is truly based on violent suppression of its citizens would cease to be democratic. Some scholars can even argue that declaring war and sending the military to fight other military is not terrorism, nor is the use of violence to punish criminals and militants, who terrorize the civilian population (Stohl, 2006).

The major contention is that if States were considered the major actors in terrorism, the whole analytical assessment of terrorism as a weapon of the weak and non-state actors to intimidate and create fear would collapse. But this is only one aspect of the argument. I align myself with scholars, who see the state as the main actor in terrorism, whose actions, by omission or commission, promotes or curtails terrorism. State terrorism refers to acts of terrorism conducted by a state against a foreign state or people, or against its own people. The encyclopedia Britannica online defines terrorism generally as “the systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective”. It is further stated that “establishment terrorism, often called state or state-sponsored terrorism, is employed by governments, or more often by factions within governments against foreign governments or groups”. Popular examples include Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and North Korea.

While the more common usage of the word terrorism refers to civilian-victimizing political violence by insurgents, militants or extremist groups, several scholars have made broader interpretation of the nature of terrorism, which implicate state-sponsored terrorism. Michael Stohl (2006) argues that “the use of terror tactics is common in international relations and the State has been and remains a more likely employer of terrorism within the international system than insurgents”. Gus Martin describes State terrorism as terror acts committed by governments and quasi-governmental agencies and personnel against perceived threats which can be
directed against both domestic and foreign targets. Similarly, Naom Chomsky defines state terrorism as “terrorism practiced by states (or governments) and their agents and allies” (Chomsky, 1998).

It is important to understand from the perspective of this lecture that in “terrorism”, the violence threatened or perpetrated has purposes broader that simple physical harm to a victim. The audience of the act or threat of violence is more important than the immediate victim.

PICTURES OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS

- Terrorist Attack on Supply Truck
- Hostage Beheading by ISIS
- 9/11 Al-Qaeda Attack of World Trade Centre, USA
- Captured Soldier Being Tortured by ISIS
- Al-Qaeda Terrorist Attack on US Navy Ship Destroyer, USS Cole, Yemen
- Al-Qaeda Cell Terrorist Preparing
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- World Trade Centre Attack, another view
- Hostages Massacred by ISIS Terrorist
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- Terrorist Display in A Training Camp
- Another Beheading by ISIS
- Terrorist Hoist Flag in Conquered Territory
PICTURES OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS

TERRORISM AND BLOOD MONEY
The infamy we attribute to terrorist groups defined as being volatile, barbaric and immeasurably reckless certainly rings true. Much of the strength of terrorist organizations lies in the interdependency they
create between themselves and the region in which they operate. Economic interdependency in particular is what makes these forces of violence and hate so difficult to combat. They become strengthened by the spoils and profits gained from acts of terrorism. There is great power in dirty money. Much of what sustains the reign of terror is the huge profits their crimes rake in through extortion, assassination, kidnapping, human trafficking, counterfeiting and drug trade. This in many ways makes terrorism a big business. Multimillion dollar donations to terrorist groups by other terrorists organizations, sympathizing political parties and bank robberies help to sustain terrorism.

With that said, it becomes a point of interest to learn about the wealthiest seven terrorist organizations.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, more commonly known as ISIS—which was once part of Al-Qaeda—has been dubbed the richest terrorist group at present. ISIS is worth an estimated $2 billion. Much of this money comes from looted weapons and bank robberies. Having captured much of the oil reserves of Syria and sections of Iraq, and some priceless artifacts from archaeological sites, ISIS has secured an enormous wealth from crime. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is dubbed the second richest terrorist organization with annual revenue of over $450 million. It originated as a revolutionary group fighting for Irish Independence from Britain. They are considered a terrorist group due to countless bombings and assassinations attributed to them during the revolt against imposed British rule in Ireland. They now own numerous businesses throughout the United Kingdom and allegedly use profits to fuel their criminal acts. The IRA further builds significant revenue through drugs, tax fraud, robberies, smuggling and counterfeiting. (www.theguardian.com/usa.terrorism).

The Taliban of Afghanistan is reported to be the third wealthiest terrorist organization with an estimated annual revenue over $400 million. Much of its revenue comes from a tightly controlled drug (opium) trade, human trafficking, extortion, as well as large donations from foreign organizations who support its goal for an
Islamic state. The fourth richest terrorist group is the Al-Qaeda, founded by Osama bin Laden, who was himself a multimillionaire.

Al-Qaeda receives about $400 million a year. Al-Qaeda has a widespread network of terrorist group allies and uses suicide bombings as a favorite tactic of destruction. Al-Qaeda’s most infamous attack is the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks of the World Trade Centre in New York in which a total of 2,996 people died, including 227 civilian and 19 hijackers aboard four planes hijacked. (www.dailystar.co.uk.new).

The Marxist Guerrilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the fifth richest terrorist organization. FARC has estimated annual revenue of $350 million. It started operation in the 1960s and has carried out numerous assassinations, kidnappings and bombings in the name of anti-imperialism. FARC is also involved in extortion and ransom collections and produces and sells vast quantities of illegal drugs. (www.ibtimes.co.uk.society.politics).

The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is the sixth richest terrorist organization. It was founded in the 1990s in Pakistan but also wreaks havoc in India. They call themselves the “Army of the Righteous” and seek public approval by supporting charitable organizations, hospitals and schools. Their annual revenue is estimated to be around $100 million, much of which is funded through donations from affiliate parties.

The seventh richest terrorist organization is the Nigerian terrorist group, Boko Haram. They aim to overthrow the Nigerian government and establish an Islamist caliphate. Boko Haram receives an annual revenue of over $70 million. It is unclear just how much money they make from their numerous kidnappings, ransoms, bank robberies and donations from other terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda. Boko Haram gained more international publicity with the bombing of the United Nations building and Police Force headquarters in Abuja, and the abduction of over 200 Chibok school girls.
State sponsored terrorist organizations seem to have been left out of the list of richest terrorist groups. This appears so because Forbes Israel (2011) ranks Hamas of Palestine as the second richest terror organization in the world with $1billion annual income, coming next to the Islamic State (ISIS). Since its takeover of political power in Gaza Strip, Hamas has transformed itself from a small terrorist organization that relied on charity and donations into a massive conglomerate, and until the advent of ISIS a year ago, Hamas was the richest terrorist organization in the world. They are involved in land deals, purchase of luxury villas and trading in black market fuel from Egypt, but they profit mainly from the smuggling business through tunnels from Sinai into Gaza. State sponsorship is crucial to the survival of some terror groups. Reports say that Qatar supports the Hamas organization, while Iran bankrolls Hezbollah – another terror organization based in Lebanon. The funds are channeled through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and charities. (www.unitedwithisrael.org/forbes).

Table 1. Richest Terrorist Organizations in the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>NAME OF ORGANISATION</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>AMOUNT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Islamic State in Syria and Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq and Syria</td>
<td>2 billion dollar ($2bn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Irish Republic Army</td>
<td>Ireland – UK</td>
<td>450 million dollars ($450m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Taliban</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>400 million dollars ($400m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Pakistan, Afghanistan, Worldwide</td>
<td>400 million dollars ($400m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>350 million dollars ($350m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lakshir Tayyiba</td>
<td>Pakistan, India</td>
<td>100 million dollars ($100m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon</td>
<td>Over 70 million dollars ($70m)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by author from Wikipedia online site.
GLOBAL TERRORISM STATISTICS
Terrorism started to make headlines in the 1970s and reached a pinnacle in the mid-1980s. From 1975 to 1984, the average number of reported terrorist attacks increased from ten per week to nearly ten every day. (Risks International, 1985). In 1985, it was observed that 10% of the world’s countries account for 60% of the world’s terrorist attacks. (Jenkins, 1985). A study on terrorist incidences in 112 countries from 1975 to 1997 (22 years) revealed that the Middle East had the highest proportion of international terrorist incidents. Europe ranked second. Africa, Asia and the Americas experienced considerably fewer international terrorist attacks in comparison with the Middle East (Li and Schaub, 2004).

More than 80% of arrested terrorist in Europe and the United States are members of the Muslim in Diaspora, mostly second and third generation immigrants (Baker, 2007). After 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, the tempo of terrorist attacks has increased. The statistics show that from 2001 to 2005 alone terrorist attacks rose from 1732 to 4995. A year later, they rose to 6659 (Martin, 2010).

The statistics on casualties from terrorist attacks is equally high. According to RAND (2011), the number of deaths as a result of terrorist attacks in Europe and North America between 2000 and 2010 was 4873; of these 4703 were casualties committed by Muslim terrorists. In Russia and Eastern Europe, the number of deaths was 1452; and in Western Europe the number was 251. In all, only 170 terrorism casualties in the US, Russia, Eastern Europe and Western Europe were not caused by Muslim terrorist attacks. By comparison, RAND (2011) reports that during the same period (2000-2010), terrorist attacks in Spain by Al-Qaeda local cells (affiliates) caused three times as many human casualties as the deaths of all combines attacks by IRA, ETA, Corsican separatists, right-wing extremists and all other non-Muslim terrorists in Europe. ETA is an armed Basque terrorist organization active in France and Spain that has killed about 900 people since 1968. Corsican terrorist have also been active in France and Corsica (an Island that is French territory).
Attacks by this terrorist group have caused few casualties. It is curious that terrorist attacks in Africa do not receive equal attention from these studies and reports. Yet recent terrorist attacks in East Africa and Nigeria have produced more casualties. For example, Boko Haram is reported to have killed up to 13000 people since 2009. In 2014 alone, Boko Haram terrorist attacks killed 4740 people (ThisDay Newspaper, January 28, 2015). The magnitude of casualties has elevated Boko Haran to the top position as the most deadly terrorist organization in the world in 2013 and 2014.

**NIGERIA’S GLOBAL TERRORISM PROFILE**

According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Nigeria ranked as the 7th most terrorized country in the world (Osundefender, 2013). This ranking made Nigeria the most terrorism stricken country in Africa alongside Somalia. The table below provides useful insight.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GTI Scale</th>
<th>World’s Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9.56</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>7.24</td>
<td>7th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Osundefender (2013)

The GTI uses four critical indicators to scale the impact of terrorism. These indicators are as follows:
1. The number of terrorist incidents
2. The number of deaths
3. The number of casualties; and
4. The level of property damage (GTI, 2013)

The aforementioned indicators are used to create a weighted five year average for each country, taking into cognizance the lasting effects of terrorism in that context. The score given to each country
in essence “indicates the impact of a terrorist attack on a society in terms of the fear and subsequent security response” (Osundefender, 2013). It was in the light of the above indices that Nigeria was rated the 7th most terrorized country of the world for the past decade of 2002 to 2011. Some of the specifics of Nigeria’s record are presented in table 3 below

Table 2: Nigeria’s Terrorism Records (2002 – 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fact</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World’s Position</td>
<td>7th of 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Incidents</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Deaths</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Injuries</td>
<td>614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Property Damaged</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Osundefender (2013)

OLD TERRORISM, NEW TERRORISM AND PARADIGM SHIFT

Walter Laguer (1999) suggests that “there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism”. He argues that old terrorism is terrorism that strikes only selected targets. New terrorism, on the other hand, is terrorism that is indiscriminate. It causes as many casualties as possible. Another major feature of new terrorism is the increasing readiness to use extreme indiscriminate violence. Laguer (1999) argues that “the new terrorism is different in character aiming not at clearly defined political demands, but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population. Why are the “new” terrorists groups more deadly than older terrorist organizations?

We can safely answer that new terrorism is a product of a new paradigm shift that sees mass destruction as a weapon for fear and intimidation. A paradigm is a pattern, world view, or model that is logically established to represent a concept. A paradigm is a way of interpreting the world that has been accepted by a group of people. When a paradigm changes, the whole group experiences a paradigm
shift, which serves to redesign strategies adopted for goal attainment.

Many experts on terrorism argue that the paradigm shift from old to new terrorism occurred at some point in the 1990s with the bombings of the World Trade Centre in New York in 1993 and the 1995 Sarin gas attack in Tokyo, Japan. While majority of old terrorism was secular in its focus and drive, new terrorism is driven mainly by religious fanaticism and extremist ideology. New terrorism rejects all other ways of life and advocates a categorical and inflexible worldview consistent with religious fanaticism. The correlation between religious fanaticism and the sharp increase of extremist terrorist organizations has been demonstrated by research studies.

Gur and Cole (2000) examined sixty-four (64) international terrorist organizations that existed in 1980, they found that only two of them were religious organizations (i.e only 3% in total). By 1995, the number of religious terrorist organizations rose sharply to twenty-five out of fifty-eight (43% in total). This represents an increase of 40% in about 15 years. In particular, they found that most of the “new” extremist groups are associated with radical Islam (Gur and Cole, 2000)

FOUR WAVES OF GLOBAL TERRORISM

The comparison between old and new terrorism can also be explained through the evolution of terrorism in four waves; the fourth wave climaxed into new terrorism. The first wave was in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries.

The second wave was the colonial wave, confined within geographical boundaries from 1921 until the eve of national independence.

The third wave was the contemporary wave; it introduced international terrorism, crossing national boundaries.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks gave rise to the fourth wave of terrorism worldwide. This wave is symbolized by religious justification for mass killing, use of gory and dastardly tactics and methods, dependence on modern technologies for propaganda and recruitment. In this fourth wave of globalized terrorism, the use of any weapon, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is justifiable.

In this fourth wave, any person or group of people is a legitimate target. No distinctions among targets is taken into account – Moslems, Christians, Africans, Europeans, Asian, any person, anywhere is a legitimate target. This heralds the reality of our age – the war of all against all. This fourth wave suggest the reign of the “Culture of Terror”. (Crelinsten, 1988; Andrew, 2003). In a book based on interviews with terrorists (titled the Terrorist Next Door), Erick Stakelbeck (2011) reported that the dominant motive for terrorist attacks in the fourth wave is “ideology”; that the culture of terrorism is seen as “a way of life”, Where does that leave the world? Where does that leave you and me? Where does that leave Nigeria? What is the experience of terrorism in Nigeria? What can be done? What is the way forward?

THE STATE AND THE CULTURE OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

It is indeed very curious that intellectual discussions and public debate on the spectre of terrorism in Nigeria is completely indifferent to the character of the state in Africa. This indifference seems to have beclouded a more critical analysis of the problem and hence compromised the strategies and approaches to achieve a more meaningful solution to terrorism in Nigeria. Historically the terrorist organizations and militants groups in Nigeria were started by elements, who had direct or indirect ties with people in government.

So at one point or the other, those who managed the powers of the state and structures of governance romanced with elements, who metamorphosed into militant or terrorist groups. The point of romance was the proclivity to use force, violence and thuggery to
acquire political power in Nigeria. Politics is the struggle to capture the powers of the state to make authoritative allocation of values and resources, make binding decisions and policies, maintain law and order, protect lives and property, and sanction offenders of the law. The very existence of a state is based on its monopoly of power. Consequently, the character of the state and how it exercises its monopoly of power determines almost every other thing in the society.

CHARACTER OF THE NIGERIAN STATE
To begin with, what is the state? According to Ake (1981; 126) “what distinguishes the state from other social institutions is that, apart from being the ultimate coercive power, it makes exclusive claim to the legitimate use of coercive force”. Hence we can say that the state is a territory in which a single authority exercises sovereign powers, both de jure and de facto over the citizens and all matters.

Where this power and authority is challenged or shared with other organizations or groups, then one or two things had occurred: either you have state failure (to a certain degree) or state compromise and complicity.

There is no consensus on the meaning of the state. However, there is substantial agreement on the definition of the state as “the organized aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance”. The main components of the state are decision making structures (executives and parliaments), decision enforcing institutions (bureaucracies, security agencies) and decision mediating agencies (courts, tribunals, commissions). Accordingly, the character of the state in a particular society is determined by the specific pattern of organization of these institutions at particular points in time (Chazan, 1988; Alapiki, 2010; 128).

Classical sociological theories of the weberian tradition and political theories of the liberal tradition view the state as a public force, which uses its monopoly of coercive force to police the society and maintain law and order. It is assumed, by this perspective, that those
who manage the state institutions and agencies would always act in
the public interest. Miliband (1969:49) aptly captures the preceding
view thus: “The state stands for a number of particular institutions
which together constitute its reality and which interact as parts of
what may be called the state system”

The point is quickly made that in this state system, it is the
government –which is not to be confused with the party in power –
that represents the state. And this does not mean that the State is
always effectively controlled by the government. Other constituent
elements in the state system include the bureaucracy, the coercive
apparatuses (i.e. police, armed forces, prisons, etc), the judiciary and
the lower levels of government in the society (Ekekwe, 1986:10).
The role of the State in the maintenance of law and order is
recognized by all the major schools of thought (liberal theorists and
Marxist scholars inclusive). Disagreement only exists over how and
in whose interest or favour, the state imposes order. Liberal scholars
for example posit that the state is neutral; that it merely plays the
role of the umpire who balances things between competing elites
and plural groups, and guides society impartially. Marxist scholars
on the other hand argue that the state is an instrument of the ruling
class because it maintains order in favour of the dominant classes.
That majorly, the State functions to preserve the status quo. Perhaps
it may be useful to point out that much of the foregoing debate on
the State is focused on the State in the advanced capitalist societies.
It has been argued that the State in Africa and peripheral capitalist
societies assumes and performs functions especially in the economy,
different from those in the advanced capitalist societies.

THE CHARACTER OF STATE AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA
Ake (1985:9) characterizes the State in Nigeria differently thus:
“The unique feature of the State in Nigeria, and this
is typical of periphery capitalist formations
generally, is that the State has limited autonomy.
That is the State is institutionally constituted in such
a way that it enjoys little independence from the
social classes, particularly the hegemonic class, and
so is immersed in the struggle of the class. (In Nigeria) there may well be a case of talking about political administration or government instead of State. It does not matter what we call it as long as we are clear about its objective character and how it differs from the pure ideas of State.”

The political implications of limited autonomy of the Nigerian State are many. First, the political differences and struggles in the society are not easily mediated because the State is also immersed in the class struggle. Because of this, it is not impartial or perceived as impartial. What this means is that the rules which govern political competition and other aspects of social life do not have adequate institutional guarantees of their impartiality. Therefore, political and economic competition becomes essentially “normless” and “lawless”, or at any rate, conducted in clear preference of efficiency norms instead of legitimacy norms. This partly characterizes Nigeria’s politics whereby in the views of Ake (1985):

“Contending groups struggle on grimly, polarizing their differences and convinced that their ability to protect their interests and to obtain justice is co-extensive with their power. That creates the politics of anxiety. In this type of politics, there is deep alienation and distrust among political competitors. Consequently, they are profoundly afraid of being in the power of their opponents. This fear in turn breeds a huge appetite for power, which is sought without restraint and used without restraint. This is the type of politics that has prevailed in Nigeria since independence”. (Ake, 1985:10).

The summary of our position on this matter is that the Nigerian State, like the colonial State before it, turns on the calculus of strength rather than legitimacy. What is uniquely negative about politics in Nigeria arises from the character of the State –its lack of autonomy, its proneness to abuse and the lack of immunity against it. The character of the State in Nigeria rules out a politics of
moderation and mandates a politics of lawlessness and extremism because the very nature of the State and the perquisites of office make the capture of State power irresistibly attractive. The State in Nigeria has appropriated the wealth and resources of the people. It has turned itself into a contested terrain where interest groups, political parties and ethnic/religious communities go to fight to capture, privatize and protect their interests. The result is, there is no “common wealth of Nigeria” because the State, unlike its counterparts in other societies, does not incarnate our collective identity. In the words of Ake (1996:70):

“How can there be (a common wealth) when we have managed to fabricate an endless war between regional, ethnic, religious and communal groups; when most of us encounter what answers to the State only as predatory force on rampage; when those who are supposed to defend us have turned their arms against us and never grant us any respite from exploitation”

This is the character of the State in Nigeria; it is the character of politics in our society. It is a State where governors act with impunity and remain above the law; a State where Senators and Assembly men do not represent any constituents but themselves; a State where police brutality is commonplace. A State where thuggery and gangsterism have become attractive ways of life. In a society such as this, people are made to believe that life is war; it is a case of survival of the fittest. And in the jungle of politics, only the strong survive. It should not come as a surprise that where impunity and lawlessness reign, we have inadvertently created the fertile ground for militancy and terrorism to grow.

STATE TERRORISM IN NIGERIA
State terrorism has been defined as acts of terrorism conducted by governments or terrorism carried out directly by, or encouraged and funded by an established government of a State. Generally, it is terrorism practiced by a government against its own people or in support of international terrorism. Dictatorships (especially military
regimes) terrorize their own populations. In the same vein, authoritarian civilian governments are also capable of terrorism. The State in Nigeria had its roots in the colonial State. Absolutism and arbitrariness were the main distinguishing features of the colonial State (Mene, 2002:48). The colonial State arbitrarily introduced exploitative policies with regard to what products should be marketed via marketing boards. Taxes and forced labor were other forms of State repression employed by the colonial State.

At independence, the Nationalists inherited this structure or instrument of State that is constituted as a specific modality of class domination. The dominant social forces and class struggled to maintain their domination, while the subordinate social forces (spearheaded by workers’ associations and peasant groups) struggled against their subordination. This scenario was made worse by the zero-sum character of Nigerian politics in which winners take all and losers have nothing. The intensity of the struggle for power and the absence of an effective mechanism to mediate conflict engendered a situation in which the process of political competition was constituted as warfare. Electoral violence, instability and political crisis became common features of the First Republic. It did not come as a surprise when the masters of warfare – the armed forces – overthrew the civilian government in the first military coup of 1966.

The emergence of military rule was the biggest setback to the growth of democracy in Nigeria. Democracy is a learning process. Military rule is the archetype of government by impunity; it governs by decrees. It does not require popular approval or majority rule. The culture of impunity became the dominant political culture in military politics and governance in Nigeria. Ake (1996) aptly summed it up thus:

“The military addresses the extreme and the extra-ordinary while democracy addresses the routine (administration); the military values discipline and hierarchy, democracy values freedom and equality; the method of the military is violent aggression, that
of democracy is persuasion, negotiation and consensus building”.

The long years of military rule in Nigeria (1966-1979 and 1983-1999), which lasted for 29 years institutionalized the culture of terrorism as a basic feature of governance. Because culture is the way of life of a people, the dominant political culture in governance has a demonstration effect on the rest of society. The process of political socialization can only inculcate the values and principles of the dominant political culture. Military tradition in governance was conducted with the mentality of “war” such that even the programme of re-orientation of the citizenry for orderly public conduct was called “war against indiscipline”. Habits, they say, die hard. Hence our politicians, who have worked closely with the military and imbibed the military culture of governance, continue to exhibit the culture of impunity. Evidently, the militarization of social life for almost 29 years largely accounts for this. In the subsequent sections, we outline some of the classic cases of State terrorism in Nigeria.

INCIDENTS OF STATE TERRORISM

1. In 1974, the building of Bakolori Dam Project in Sokoto State led to a violent clash between the military and peasant farmers. The siting of the dam led to loss of farmlands by the peasants. The remaining portion of the land were generally flooded by the dam. Following protests by the farmers, the government reclaimed the lands and re-allocated parcels of land to the peasants on condition that they cultivate cash crops such as wheat, rice and vegetables. This conflicted with the peasants’ own priorities and crop preferences. The disagreement degenerated into violent conflicts and the government deployed the military who brutally suppressed the uprising. The ensuing conflict resulted in the burning of villages, killing and wounding hundreds of men, women and children (Summit, 1990; Yahaya, 2002).

2. On November 1, 1990, the people of Umuechem, a town 37 kilometres from Port Harcourt in Rivers State had a taste of
State terrorism. The Nigerian Mobile Police Force invaded the community, pulling down gates, walls and other structures. The police occupied the town for seven days and when they left, the traditional ruler – His Royal Highness, Chief Alexander Ordu, his two sons (Ekwubiri and Nwaraegbu) and three brothers of Akpan family (Okon, Friday and Ebenezer), among scores of other persons were killed (African Concord, 1990: 14; National Agenda, 1996:12). The Umuechem incident was said to have started the previous day October 31, 1990. The community youths and women had gathered to peacefully protest the neglect of the community by Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) since 1957 when oil was discovered in the area. With no pipe-borne water, no electricity, no secondary school and no university scholarships to indigenes of the town after 33 years of oil exploration in their community, the people felt sufficiently aggrieved and proceeded to peacefully protest at the SPDC facility. The company (SPDC) quickly asked for “Government Protection”. In response, the government dispatched a team of armed policemen to quell the protest. The result was the casualties reported above (African Concord, 1990: 23; Newswatch Magazine, 1995:10). A government inquiry into the Umuechem Massacre revealed that neither SPDC nor the police were under any major threat from the villagers. The report of the government panel only apportioned blame, where it could not hide the facts, when it Stated that:

“The mobile police who attacked Umuechem village was like an individual army that had vowed to take the last drop of the enemy’s blood. They threw all human reasoning to the wind, shot people and razed down a total of 495 houses in the village with blast grenades. The preponderant share of this responsibility rests with the mobile police force who forgot that their duty was to protect life and property and not to destroy them (Tell Magazine, 1994:13).

3. Beginning from January 1990, the people of Ogoni in Rivers State embarked on a sustained protest to express their concern
over oil exploration in their land. They complained that for over 35 years, oil resources had been exploited with very little or no returns to compensate them for the attendant destruction of the environment and livelihood. The Ogonis also blamed the government for condoning the recklessness and disregard of standard environmental protection measures by SPDC. Reports showed that:

The Ogoni environment had been systematically destroyed by the oil companies which in collusion with Nigerian governments have been appropriating their natural resources without adequate compensation for their losses. (i.e) unproductive farmlands, polluted water sources and general environmental degradation (Tell Magazine, 1993:28)

Under the auspices of a Pan-Ogoni pressure group –the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ogonis steadfastly confronted oil workers and their police escorts with demonstrations leading to work stoppages and the loss of 200 million dollars of revenue in 1993 alone. The government responded militarily. By 1994 government military repression accounted for the death of about 1000 Ogoni people in what international Human Rights groups dubbed “genocide in Ogoniland”. In one incident in the town of Kaa, at least 35 men, women and children were killed and over 5000 people rendered homeless by government forces (Africa Magazine, 1994:2)

4. On December 11, 1998, Ijaw Youths met in Kaiama, Bayelsa State and formed the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). The council adopted a declaration which demanded for:

“The immediate withdrawal from Ijaw land, of all military forces of occupation and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the services of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to protect its operations will be viewed as an enemy of the Ijaw people. Family members of military personnel stationed in Ijaw land should appeal to
their people to leave the Ijaw alone (IYC Declaration, 1998:2).

The declaration warned that unspecified steps would be taken to implement the resolutions by December 30, 1998 by youths in “all the communities in all Ijaw clans in the Niger Delta”. Expectedly, on December 30, 1998 youths supporting the IYC declaration held peaceful demonstrations in different communities across Ijaw land. In Bomadi town in Delta State, the military administrator, Navy Captain Walter Feghabo, attended and it was peaceful. But in Yenagoa, capital of Bayelsa State, soldiers posted at the gate of the Government House, opened fire on the peaceful demonstrators, killing three youths (Obari, 1999:8). The next day, Ijaw Youths from the nearby communities of Kaiama and Odi town headed for Yenagoa town for mass demonstration. They were intercepted by soldiers at Mbiama junction on the East-West road. Fighting ensued and more than 10 youths were killed. (Human Rights Watch, 1999:7). The recourse to military might did not restore peace in the Niger Delta Region. Attacks and counter attacks by soldiers and militant youths reinforced the culture of violence in the region and by year end, precisely on December 4, 1999 culminated in the infamous Odi Massacre. A detachment of Nigerian Army invaded the town, ostensibly in search of militant youths. The community was bombarded, houses razed and scores of people killed. (Tell Magazine, December 6, 1999; Alapiki, 2000:133).
PICTURES OF VIOLENCE ON CITIZENS BY SECURITY AGENTS

Plate 24: Police Brutality 4

Plate 22: Police Brutality 2

Plate 23: Police Brutality 3

Plate 24: Police Brutality 4
PICTURES OF VIOLENCE ON CITIZENS BY SECURITY AGENTS

Military Repression on Civilian

Mobile Police Brutality

Another Mobile Police Brutality

Plate 28: More Mobile Police Brutality

Army Brutality

Couple Battered by Policeman
CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA
Several factors have been identified by analysts and scholars as being responsible for terrorism in Nigeria. The factors range from corruption, poverty, unemployment, religious extremism, illiteracy among others. The contemporary Nigerian society is engulfed by terrible acts of terrorism. But as we have shown in this lecture paper, terror acts have been committed by both the State and terrorist organizations. One of the major contentions in this paper is that contemporary terrorism in Nigeria is a product of “bad governance” and the character of the State in Nigeria, which encourages a “culture of impunity”. This is a product of prolong failure of the State to provide purposeful leadership and deliver the dividends of “good governance” to the people. State neglect and State terrorism breeds a “culture of terrorism” and other segments, individuals and groups in the society imbibe this dominant political culture as a way of life. While this paper recognizes that there are other predisposing variables like economic marginalization, ethnic and religious fanaticism which influence terrorism, we contend that official corruption, State neglect and impunity, poverty and unemployment constitute the main causes of terrorism in Nigeria.

Economic and political factors offer deeper insights into the causes of terrorism. We argue that economic deprivation, political marginalization, frustration and civil disobedience in Nigeria are by products of official corruption. When public officers and politicians at federal, State and local government levels steal public funds allocated to build schools, hospitals, industries and provision of basic social services like water, electricity and road infrastructure, Nigerians are denied good governance. The youths especially are negatively affected –socially, psychologically and economically. As Adeyemi (2012) argues, “frustration, dejection and hopelessness remain as a daily experience in their lives. They can easily be brainwashed and indoctrinated into illegal activities and terrorism”. We make bold to say that terrorism, among other challenges, is the price we pay for producing a “reserved army” of depraved, deprived, frustrated and unemployed youths as a consequence of official corruption and a dysfunctional federal system of
government. Let us proceed to demonstrate the interconnection between official corruption and terrorism in Nigeria.

**CORRUPTION**

Corruption can be viewed as the deliberate or inadvertent violation of ethics and codes that are supposed to govern the behavior of a particular profession, public service, private transaction, contractual agreements and actions which lead to selfish and dishonest personal gains to the disadvantage of another person, the system, or society in general. This may include abuse of office, misuse of power and authority for repressive and oppressive purposes, victimization, electoral malpractice, bribery, diversion of public funds, and inflation of contracts, amongst others. Indeed one’s failure to perform his duties also amounts to corruption. All of these can combine to breed discontent, frustration, deprivation, criminality and terrorism. Unfortunately, when we talk about corruption, our minds readily go to embezzlement, bribery, misappropriation of funds and kick-backs. This may be so because we can more easily relate to the consequences and connection between the lack of provision of public goods and the diversion of such monies for personal and selfish use. See table 2 below as an example.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>MINISTRY</th>
<th>AMOUNT MISAPPROPRIATED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION IN AFRICA</td>
<td>₦10,453,241.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>POWER AND STEEL</td>
<td>₦4,394,649,602.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>WORK AND HOUSING</td>
<td>₦2,262,797,737.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>DEFENSE</td>
<td>₦1,785,877,023.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>EDUCATION</td>
<td>₦265,272,388.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>POLICE AFFAIRS</td>
<td>₦1,209,216,325.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>INFORMATION</td>
<td>₦664,124,321.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>COMMERCE</td>
<td>₦640,053,177.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>HEALTH</td>
<td>₦465,103,959.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>INDUSTRY</td>
<td>₦356,064,369.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>₦23,860,732,145.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5. Classified Looting of Funds in Nigeria Before the Anti-Corruption Bill in 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Amount in London</th>
<th>Amount in Swiss</th>
<th>Deposit in USA</th>
<th>Deposit in Germany</th>
<th>Total Naira Equivalent (1999)</th>
<th>Naira Exchange Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gen. Babangida</td>
<td>£6.256b</td>
<td>$7.416b</td>
<td>$2.00b</td>
<td>Dm9.00b</td>
<td>N2.463,005trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Gen. Abubakar</td>
<td>£1.131b</td>
<td>$2.33b</td>
<td>$800b</td>
<td>Dm16.00m</td>
<td>N0.493,008trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mike Akhigbe</td>
<td>£1.24b</td>
<td>$2.426b</td>
<td>$671b</td>
<td>Dm9.00m</td>
<td>N0.805,009trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jerry Useni</td>
<td>£3.04b</td>
<td>$2.01b</td>
<td>$1.03b</td>
<td>Dm900m</td>
<td>N0.805,009trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ismaila Gownon</td>
<td>£1.03b</td>
<td>$2.00b</td>
<td>$1.03b</td>
<td>Dm700m</td>
<td>N0.501,076trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Umaru Diko</td>
<td>£4.4b</td>
<td>$1.46b</td>
<td>$700m</td>
<td>Dm345m</td>
<td>N0.894,065trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Paul Ogwuma</td>
<td>£300m</td>
<td>$1.42b</td>
<td>$200m</td>
<td>Dm500m</td>
<td>N35,000,000billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gen. Sani Abacha</td>
<td>£5.01b</td>
<td>$4.09b</td>
<td>$800m</td>
<td>Dm3.01m</td>
<td>N1.210,007trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mohammed Abacha</td>
<td>£300m</td>
<td>$1.2b</td>
<td>$150150m</td>
<td>Dm535</td>
<td>N0.210,007trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Abdu Abacha</td>
<td>£700m</td>
<td>$1.21b</td>
<td>$900m</td>
<td>Dm417m</td>
<td>N0.338,004trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Wada Nas</td>
<td>£300m</td>
<td>$1.32b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Dm300m</td>
<td>N0.237,004trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Tom Ikimi</td>
<td>£400b</td>
<td>$1.39b</td>
<td>$153m</td>
<td>Dm371m</td>
<td>N0.252,553trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Dan Etiete</td>
<td>£1.12b</td>
<td>$1.03b</td>
<td>$400m</td>
<td>Dm1.72</td>
<td>N0.372,043trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Don Etiebet</td>
<td>£2.5b</td>
<td>$1.06b</td>
<td>$700m</td>
<td>Dm361m</td>
<td>N0.567,047trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Majial Mustapha</td>
<td>£600m</td>
<td>$1.001b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Dm210m</td>
<td>N0.199,793trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Bashiru Dalhatu</td>
<td>£2.9b</td>
<td>$1.09b</td>
<td>$360m</td>
<td>Dm1.66b</td>
<td>N0.688,095trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Worhishi Ibrahim</td>
<td>£2.3b</td>
<td>$1.001b</td>
<td>$161m</td>
<td>Dm1.43m</td>
<td>N0.555,049trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Hassan Adamu</td>
<td>£300m</td>
<td>$200m</td>
<td>$700m</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N0.130,005trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>T.Y Danjuma</td>
<td>£1.36b</td>
<td>$1.02b</td>
<td>$300m</td>
<td>Dm190m</td>
<td>N0.342,007trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ishaya Bamiyi</td>
<td>£120m</td>
<td>$800m</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N94,000,000billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Financial Times of London (23rd July, 1999), The Nigerian Commentator (vol.2 No.4 1999)

An indication of just how corrupt Nigeria is was documented in the worldwide Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International. In 1998, Nigeria was ranked as the most...
corrupt country in the world. It also topped the list of most corrupt nations with respect to the conduct of business, followed by Bolivia, Colombia, Russia and Pakistan (Transparency International 1998). Over the years, Nigeria has slightly improved in ranking reaching its best position of 136 in 2014, better than the 2013 ranking of 144 out of 175 nations in the world. The best 10 ranked countries in the 2014 worldwide Corruption Perception Index are: (1) Denmark, (2) New Zealand, (3) Finland, (4) Sweden, (5) Norway (6) Switzerland (7) Singapore, (8) Netherlands, (9) Luxemburg, and (10) Canada.

It is interesting to note that all or most of these nations are virtually free of terrorism. On the other hand, the worst ten ranked nations on the Corruption Perception Index suffer from high levels of domestic terrorism and/or State terrorism. These countries are (1) North Korea, (2) Somalia, (3) Sudan, (4) Afghanistan, (5) South Sudan, (6) Iraq, (7) Eritrea, (8) Libya, (9) Venezuela, (10) Yemen (Transparency International, 2014).

There are numerous accounts and examples of high profile corruption in Nigeria which should not detain us here. Suffice it to mention the celebrated cases of the missing $12.4 billion of Nigeria’s oil revenue from the central bank accounts during the Babangida regime (Onwudiwe, 2004), the pension scam where civil servants were robbed of billions of naira by government officials, the fuel subsidy scam in which NNPC, fuel marketers and importers colluded to defraud this country, and many more cases that investigation and prosecutions have been stalled, like the Aviation Scam. These are all results of bad governance. Corruption does not end with the stealing of public resources; it undermines justice, economic development and destroys public trust in government and political leaders. Corruption is a major cause of mass poverty. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) report for 2014 reveals that 112.47 million Nigerians (about 70%) live below $1.00 per day, as a result, they could barely afford the minimal standards of food, clothing, health care and shelter.
The NBS further reports that 20.3 million Nigerians are jobless. The figure is inclusive of 5.3 million unemployed youths and an average of 1.8 million graduates who enter into the labor market annually (Sunnewsonline, June 3, 2014). The North-West and North-East recorded the highest poverty rates in 2010 with 77.7% and 76.3% respectively (Awoyemi, 2012). See table 3 below:

Table 6: Poverty Rates in Nigeria by Geo-Political Zones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>GEO-POLITICAL ZONE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>South-South</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>South-West</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Awoyemi, 2012

It is easy to see the connection between corruption, unemployment, poverty and terrorism. The large mass of poverty stricken unemployed youths constitute fertile soil for recruitment as foot soldiers by terrorist organizations. There is a saying that “idleness is a disease”. It is further said that “the idle mind is the devil’s workshop”. Unemployment and poverty make our teeming youths vulnerable to terrorism and criminality. If we do not do something urgently, the near future portends more danger.

UNVEILING THE TERRORIST GROUPS IN NIGERIA

The contemporary Nigerian society is engulfed by terrible acts of terrorism. Terrorists and militant groups have unleashed havoc on the Nigerian society. Though these groups are numerous, the most lethal and deadly are the Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militants groups in terms of casualties, scope of operation and effects on the economy of the nation. It may be necessary to keep at the back of our minds the statement that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.

38
THE NIGER DELTA MILITANTS
The Niger Delta region is inhabited by a number of long settled communities and kingdoms. It is the hub of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry, and covers six states of Nigeria, which are Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers State. See the map of Nigeria below showing the Niger Delta region.

Map 1: Map of Nigeria showing Niger Delta region

There are different perspectives and accounts of militancy in the Niger Delta region.
According to General Muhammedu Buhari:
“All Nigerians that are following events will know the reality. Some governors wanted to win their elections. They employed these boys and armed them to fight their opponents. After their forceful victory, they could not retrieve the weapons and they stopped paying the boys. The irate youths then started kidnapping and it became the order of the day. A boy of 18 to 20 was getting 500 dollars a week as ransom in 7 days. What will stop him doing it? And why will he go to school and spend 20 years and then come back to work for peanuts? (www.saharareporters.com/nigerdelta)
The opinion expressed by Buhari simply corresponds to commonplace knowledge of the origin of militancy in the Niger Delta region. A deeper analysis is necessary to unveil the historical background of political domination and economic marginalization, environmental degradation and sub-human living conditions of many oil producing communities in the Niger Delta region, which combined to engender resistance and protests against the State and multinational oil companies. The resistance turned violent in direct response to State terrorism as a preferred approach adopted by the Nigerian State to maintain law and order. For example, on January 4, 1999, about one hundred soldiers from the military base at Chevron’s Escravos facility attacked two Ijaw communities of Opia and Ikiyan in Delta State to flush out “militants”. Chief Bright Pablogba, the traditional ruler of Ikiyan, who came to the river side to negotiate with the soldiers, was shot dead, along with a 7-year-old girl, and dozens of others. The soldiers set the villages ablaze, destroyed canoes and fishing equipment, killed livestock, burnt churches and traditional shrines. The inhabitants of the two villages became refugees in neighbouring communities (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Let us skip the background reasons for militancy in the Niger Delta region and proceed to identify the major militant groups that were active in the region.

1. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) – This is the umbrella organization of the groups in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. In November 2005, following series of meetings between representatives of different militant groups, which included the Federation of Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Klansmen Konfraternity (KK), Greenlanders, among others, led to the emergence of a new group called MEND. An agreement was made to start using militant force to attack oil installations. The aim was to destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil. Additionally, MEND called upon President Obasanjo to release Asari Dokubo and Diepreye Alamieseigha from detention. It was not until 2007
that Obasanjo’s successor, President Umaru Musa Yar Adua, authorized the release of the duo.

2. Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) – operating under the MEND umbrella, and sometimes referred to as Western MEND, the FNDIC was founded in Delta State where militants organized along more rigid ethnic lines than in Rivers and Bayelsa States. The group called for Ijaw self-determination in the Warri area and openly opposed both the oil industry and the Nigerian government. Led politically by Oboko Bello and militarily by former oil industry employee, Tom Polo, the FNDIC built a heavily fortified complex in the creeks (Asuni, 2009; Ikelegbe 2005)

3. General Boyloaf Organization – operating under the MEND umbrella in Bayelsa State, Boyloaf’s organization is sometimes referred to as Central MEND. The pseudonym of the group’s leader, Victor Ben, “Boyloaf” was believed to have had the closest ties with Henry Okah, who often issued Statements to the press on behalf of Central MEND.

4. Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) – This group was founded by Mujahid Asari-Dokubo, a former president of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC). In 2004, the group threatened an all-out war against the oil industry which caused a spike in global oil prices. Asari Dokubo’s arrest in 2005 by the Nigerian government on treason charges played a role in the formation of MEND. He was released in 2007. The NDPVF maintained close relations with another group known as the Martyrs Brigade.

5. Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) – formed in 2003 by Ateke Tom, the NDV operated mainly in Rivers State. Like other militant groups, the NDV accepted Amnesty in 2009 and agreed to surrender arms (Amaize, 2009; Vanguard, February 14, 2010).

6. Other Groups – other prominent militant groups in the Niger Delta region include: (a) The Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), led by Farah Dagogo; (b) The Outlaws formed by Soboma George, (c) the People’s Liberation Force (PLF), led by Egberipapa – also known as Soboma Jackrich. (Los Angeles Times, October 26, 2009)
Table 7: Police Record of Some Cases of Kidnapping and Piracy in the Niger Delta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Action Date</th>
<th>MNC/Oil Serving Company</th>
<th>Youth Group/Ethnic Group State</th>
<th>Ascertained Purpose</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hostage taking of 10 workers/April 1 2002</td>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>Militant Youth Gang, Ekeremor LGA, Ijaw/Bayelsa State</td>
<td>Ransom demand for NGN3.1m</td>
<td>Resulted from failure to yield to alleged frivolous demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kidnap of staff/June 29 –July 2003</td>
<td>Oil serving company working for Shell</td>
<td>Ijaw youth militants in Bomadi/ Burutu LGAs/Delta State</td>
<td>Demand for NGN25.4m</td>
<td>State government intervention /Negotiated release after 14 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Kidnap of 9 crew and 4 military escorts of oil barges/November 13, 2003</td>
<td>Ijaw Militants</td>
<td>Ransom/ other demands</td>
<td>Released 2 days later after threats by State government/security agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Kidnap of 19 oil workers</td>
<td>Nobel Drilling/ Prospecting</td>
<td>Ijaw Militias/Delta State</td>
<td>Ransom demands</td>
<td>Intervention of State government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Kidnap of 7 workers November 28-December 2003</td>
<td>Bredero Shaw Oil Servicing Company (Shell)</td>
<td>Militant Ijaw Youths/Delta State</td>
<td>Ransom demands for USD5m</td>
<td>Intervention of State government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Murder of 7 workers and military personnel/April 2004</td>
<td>Chevron Texaco</td>
<td>Militant youth along Benin River are/Delta State</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A.IKelegbe (2005), Nordic Journal of African Studies, 14 (2)
PICTURES OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY NIGER DELTA MILITANTS

- Niger Delta Militants Attack Boat
- Niger Delta Militants Display Hostages
- Show of Force by MEND Fighters
- Niger Delta Militants on Parade
- Environmental Degradation in the Niger Delta
- Shanty House in the Niger Delta
PICTURES OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY NIGER DELTA MILITANTS

- Oil Pipeline Fire in the Niger Delta
- MEND Hostage
- JTF Gun boat
- Militants’ Attack Boat
- MEND Hostage
- MEND Militants on Patrol
BOKO HARAM SECT
Boko Haram is a terrorist Islamist movement based in north-east Nigeria, but also active in Chad, Niger Republic and Northern Cameroon. The group is led by Abubakar Shekau. Estimates of membership vary between 5000 and 10000 fighters. They have been linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS). Reports say Boko Haram killed more than 5000 civilians between January 2009 and June 2014, including at least 2000 in the first half of 2014. Since 2009, Boko Haram have abducted over 500 men, women and children, including the kidnapping of 276 school girls from Chibok town in April 2014. Over 650,000 people had fled the conflict areas of north-east and north-central Nigeria by August 2014, an increase of 200,000 over the figure of May 2014. By the end of the year 2014, the figure for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) had climbed to 1.5 million persons (www.cfr.org.councilofforeignrelations, January 2015). See below the map of Nigeria showing Boko Haram endemic territories

Map 2 – Map of Nigeria showing Boko Haram endemic territories
Mohammed Yusuf founded the Boko Haram sect in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno State. He established a religious complex and school that attracted poor Muslim families from across the north-east mainly and neighbouring countries. The centre had the political goal of creating an Islamic State, and became a recruiting ground for young Jihadist. By denouncing the police and official corruption, Mohammed attracted followers from the unemployed youth. The government repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasing militant character of the organization. The council of Ulama advised the government and the Nigerian Television Authority not to broadcast Yusuf’s preaching, but the warnings were ignored. For seven years, Boko Haram was left to grow in strength, membership and organization. Government’s indifference may not be unconnected to the support and sympathy of influential politicians. Some of the new members were children of influential northerners such as the son of former Yobe State Governor (Bukar Abba Ibrahim), who is now a senator. A former commissioner of Borno State, Alhaji Buji Foi, was also reported to be a member of the sect (www.saharareporters.com/history-bokoharam).

Boko Haram’s campaign of violence started in 2009 with the killing of policemen in Bauchi, Bornu and Yobe States. The intervention of the army restored calm and led to the arrest of the sect’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, the former commissioner of Bornu State, Buji Foi, and several sect members.

There are strong suspicions that the extra judicial killing of the sect leader, Mohammed Yusuf and Buji Foi, in police custody was to prevent the exposure and link of the sect to prominent politicians in an eventual court trial and prosecution.

After this incident, Abubakar Shekau, who had returned from military training in Sudan and Libya, emerged as the new leader and relocated the sect’s headquarters to northern Cameroon. He re-organized the group into the Al-Qaeda model, and broke the structure into cells, which are largely independent of each other.
This cellular structure and apparent lack of unity or centralized command makes them particularly difficult to negotiate with.

In September 2010, having regrouped under their new leader, Shekau, the group started a campaign of violence in Nigeria. They began with an attack on Maiduguri prisons where they released 105 detained Boko Haram members, along with over 600 other prisoners. A string of other attacks followed as would be shown in the sections below. See tables 8 and 9 below for a profile of Boko Haram and the nature of Boko Haram terrorist incidents among selected northern states.

Table 8: Profile of Boko Haram

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>ITEMS</th>
<th>RELEVANT FACTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Official Description</td>
<td>Congregation of the people tradition for the proselytism and Jihad (Arabic: Jama’at ahl as-Sunnah hid-da ‘wu wal-jihad)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2   | Mission/Objectives     | i. Islamization of (Northern) Nigeria  
ii. Implementation of Sharia  
iii. Sanitazation/purification of the practice of Islam |
| 3   | Core Doctrines/Precepts| i. Rational but (heretical) Islamism  
ii. Anti-west (hostility to western civilization and education)  
iii. Pro-sharia (it favours Islamic state based on the principle of sharia) |
| 4   | Manifest Ideology      | Neo-jihadism in furtherance of revivalist Islamic proselytism                 |
| 5   | Main Operational Base  | Borno in North-eastern geo-political zone                                     |
| 6   | Span of Activity       | 2001 – present                                                               |
| 7   | Ideological Influence/motivation | Religious extremism/Islamic fundamentalism                                    |
| 8   | Mode of Operation      | i. Mass killing  
ii. Suicide bombing  
iii. Arson  
viv. Hostage taking  
v. Banditry  
vi. Media propaganda  
vii. Guerrilla warfare |
| 9   | Leaders                | i. Abubakar Shekau (current)  
ii. Momodu Bama (late)  
iii. Mohammed Yusuf (late) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10</th>
<th>External allies</th>
<th>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 11  | Source of Funding | i. Bank Robbery  
   |                  | ii. Ransom kidnapping  
   |                  | iii. Forced and freewill donations  
   |                  | iv. Financial aids from international terrorist organizations |
| 12  | Area of Operation (by country) | i. Northern Nigeria  
   |                  | ii. Northern Cameroon  
   |                  | iii. Niger Republic  
   |                  | iv. Chad |
| 13  | Opponents | i. The Nigerian State  
   |                  | ii. The Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF)  
   |                  | iii. The military and para-military outfits (police, the state security service –SSS, etc) |
| 14  | Major Battles | i. The Sharia riots (2001)  
   |                  | ii. Sectarian violence 2009 |
| 15  | Membership and Command System | Cult-like membership, and leadership characterized by marked absolutism |


Table 9: Nature of Boko Haram Terrorist Incidents in Selected Nigerian States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>NATURE OF TERRORIST INCIDENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>Pervasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yobe</td>
<td>Pervasive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Appreciably Prevalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adamawa</td>
<td>Appreciably Prevalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Taraba</td>
<td>Scarcely Occurring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Kogi</td>
<td>Scarcely Occurring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td>Scarcely Occurring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FCT Abuja</td>
<td>Sporadic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Timeline of Boko Haram Insurgency

Year 2009
July 26–29, 2009 – Clashes between Boko Haram militants and Nigerian soldiers in different States of northern Nigeria claimed nearly 1,000 lives.

July 30 - Mohammed Yusuf, spiritual leader of Boko Haram, was killed and Abubakar Shekau takes control of the sect.

Year 2010
September 7 - Bauchi prison break, 5 people are killed and 721 inmates are freed from prison in Bauchi by suspected Boko Haram gunmen.
December 31 - Abuja attack, a bomb attack outside a barracks in Abuja kills four civilians.

Year 2011
May 29 – Coordinated bombings in northern Nigeria during Goodluck Jonathan's swearing in as the new president kills 15 people in Abuja and Bauchi.
June 16 - At least two people, the perpetrator and a traffic policeman, are killed in a failed bombing of Abuja's police headquarters. It is Nigeria's first instance of a suicide bombing.
August 26 - 2011 Abuja United Nations bombing, 21 people are killed in a bombing attack on a United Nations compound in Abuja.
November 4 – About 100 to 150 people are killed in a series of coordinated assaults in Damaturu.
December 22–23 – About 68 people, (50 militants, at least 7 soldiers, and 11 civilians), are killed in clashes between Boko Haram militants and Nigerian soldiers in Maiduguri and Damaturu.
December 25 – At least 41 people are killed by Boko Haram bomb attacks and shootings on Christian churches.
Year 2012
During 2012, 792 people were killed as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency.
January 5–6 - Around 37 Christians are targeted and killed by Boko Haram militants.
January 20 – About 183 people, of whom at least 150 are civilians and 32 are police officers, are killed in Kano State by Boko Haram gunmen.
April 8 – Around 38 people are killed following a bombing at a church in Kaduna.
June 17 – At least 19 people are killed following bomb attacks against three churches in Kaduna.
August 7 – 19 people are killed when Boko Haram gunmen raided Deeper Life church in Kogi State.
August 8 - Two Nigerian soldiers and one civilian are killed in a mosque in an apparent reprisal attack for a previous day’s massacre.
December 25 - Shootings by suspected Boko Haram militants in Maiduguri and Potiskum claimed the lives of 27 Christians.
December 28 - Another 15 Christians are killed in the village of Musari by unknown gunmen.

YEAR 2013
Islamist insurgency in Nigeria 2013 fatalities were at least 1,000-1,007+:
January 1 - Nigerian Army raid kills 13 militants.
January 4 - Ogun prison break, 15 inmates are freed in a prison break in Ogun State. Boko Haram is not suspected to be involved in the attack.
February 8 - Attack on polio vaccinators kills 9 women.
March 18 - 2013 Kano bus bombing, between 22 and 65 people are killed in Kano by a car bombing.
April 16 - 2013 Baga massacre, 187 people are killed in Baga in Borno State.
June – At least 9 children are killed in Maiduguri and 13 students and teachers are killed in Damaturu by Boko Haram.
July 6 - More than 42 are killed by Boko Haram gunmen in a Yobe State school.
August 12 - 56 people are killed by Boko Haram in a Maiduguri mosque.
September 12 - Ambush by Boko Haram leaves 40 soldiers dead.
September 12–18 - An offensive by Nigerian Army leaves 150 Islamists and 16 soldiers dead.
September 19 - Benisheik attacks, 161 are killed in attacks blamed on Boko Haram.
September 20 - An Abuja shootout leaves 79 killed.
September 29 - More than 50 students are killed in Yobe State by Boko Haram gunmen when they attacked Gujba College.
October 10 - An attack at Damboa leaves at least 20 killed (15 suspected militants and 5 civilians).
October - Government forces raid rebel camps, killing around 101 Boko Haram fighters.
October 29 - At least 128 people are killed (95 militants, 23 soldiers, 8 policemen, and 2 civilians) when Boko Haram raided Damaturu.

YEAR 2014
January 26 - Northern Nigeria attacks, 138 killed.
January 31 - Boko Haram militants attacked and killed 11 Christians in Chakawa.
February 14 – Boko Haram attacks Konduga in Borno State killing 121 Christian villagers.
February 15 - Izghe attack, 106 killed the village of Izghe, Borno State by Boko Haram gunmen.
February 15 – About 90 Christians and 9 Nigerian soldiers are killed in Gwoza by Boko Haram.
February 24 - Dozens killed as Boko Haram again raids Izghe.
March 14 - Boko Haram attacks the heavily fortified Giwa military barracks in Maiduguri, freeing comrades from a detention facility. The military then executes about 600 unarmed recaptured detainees, according to Amnesty International.
April 14 - Over 88 people killed in a twin bombing attack in Abuja.
April 15 – About 276 female students in Chibok, Borno State are kidnapped by Boko Haram.
May 1 – At least 19 killed in Abuja by a car bomb.
May 5 - At least 300 people are killed in the twin towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State by Boko Haram militants.
May 20 - At least 118 villagers are killed by car bombs in the city of Jos.
May 27 - 49 security personnel and 9 civilians are killed during a Boko Haram attack on a military base in Yobe State.
May 30 - The third emir of Gwoza, Idrissa Timta, is assassinated during a Boko Haram ambush.
June 1 - At least 40 people are killed by a bomb in Mubi, Adamawa State.
June 2 - At least 200, mostly Christians, are killed in several villages in Borno State by Boko Haram.
June 20–23 - About 70 people are killed and 91 women and children kidnapped by Boko Haram militants in Borno State.
June 23–25 - Around 171 people are killed in a series of attacks in the Middle Belt of Nigeria.
June 26 - Over 100 militants are killed by the Nigerian military during raid on two Boko Haram camps.
June 28 – A bomb attack kills 11 people in Bauchi.
July 18 - At least 18 are killed by a Boko Haram attack in Damboa, leaving the town almost destroyed.
July 22 – An attack on Chibok leaves 51 people dead
November 2 - Kogi prison break, 99 inmates in Kogi State are freed by suspected Boko Haram rebels.
November 3–10 - A double suicide bombing in Yobe State kills 15 Shiites on the 3rd and 46 students on the 10th.
November 25 - Over 45 people are killed by two suicide bombers in Maiduguri, Borno State.
November 27 - Around 50 people are killed in Damasak by Boko Haram militants.
November 28 - 2014 Kano bombing, at 120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi II, are killed during a suicide bombing and gun attack by Boko Haram. The 4 gunmen are subsequently killed by an angry mob.
December 13 - Between 32 and 35 are killed and between 172 and 185 are kidnapped by Boko Haram in Gumsuri, Borno State.
December 22 - Gombe bus station bombing kills at least 27 people. December 28–29 - December 2014 Cameroon clashes, 85 civilians, 94 militants, and 2 Cameroonian soldiers are killed following a failed Boko Haram offensive into Cameroon's Far North Region.

YEAR 2015
January 2 - Boko Haram militants attack a bus in Waza, Cameroon, killing eleven people.
January 3–7 - Boko Haram militants raze the entire town of Baga. Bodies lay strewn on Baga's streets with as many as 2,000 people having been killed.
January 3 - Fleeing villagers from a remote part of the Borno State report that Boko Haram had three days prior kidnapped around 40 boys and young men.
January 5 - News emerges that two days prior hundreds of Boko Haram militants had overrun several towns in northeast Nigeria and captured the military base in Baga.
January 9 - Refugees flee Nigeria's Borno State following the Boko Haram massacre in the town of Baga. 7,300 flee to neighbouring Chad while over 1,000 are trapped on the island of Kangala in Lake Chad. Nigeria's army vows to recapture the town, while Niger and Chad withdraw their forces from a transnational force tasked with combating militants.
January 10 - A female suicide bomber, believed to be aged around 10-years-old, kills herself and 19 others, possibly against her will, at a market in Maiduguri.
January 11 - More female suicide bombers, this time two, and again each believed to be around 10 years old, kill themselves and three others at a market in Potiskum.
January 12 - January 2015 Kolofata raid, Boko Haram militants launch a failed raid on Kolofata in Cameroon. The Cameroonian military claims the army lost only one officer while the Islamic group lost between 143-300 rebels.
January 16 - The Military of Chad enters Cameroon to assist in fighting against Boko Haram insurgents.
January 17 - Following the January 16 Chad authorities decision to send troops to Nigeria and Cameroon to fight Boko Haram militants,
the Russian ambassador to the country pledges to supply Cameroon with more modern weapons to combat the Islamist insurgents.

January 18 - Boko Haram militants kidnap 80 people and kill three others from villages in north Cameroon.

January 20 - Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, claims responsibility for the attack on the town of Baga, Nigeria in which an unknown number of civilians were killed.

January 24 – About 15 people are killed as Boko Haram gunmen attempt to burn down the village of Kambari near Maiduguri.

January 25 - Boko Haram rebels launch a large offensive against Nigerian forces in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, leading to the deaths of at least 8 civilians, up to 53 militants, and an unknown number of soldiers. Although the attack fails, the rebels manage to capture the nearby strategic town of Monguno. The status of the 1,400 soldiers stationed in Monguno is unknown.

January 28 - Boko Haram fighters killed 40 people while on a rampage in Adamawa State.

January 29 - The Nigerian military, in collaboration with Chadian soldiers, captures the border town of Michika from Boko Haram rebels.

January 31 - The African Union pledges to send up to 7,500 international soldiers to aid Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram. Chadian forces claim to have killed 120 Boko Haram fighters while losing only 3 soldiers of their own during fighting in the north of Cameroon.

February 1 - Boko Haram again attacks the capital city of Borno State, Maiduguri. This time, the city is attacked from four out of the five sides. The attack is unsuccessful. Also, a suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber kills himself and eight others at the residence of a politician in Potiskum. Another suicide bomber kills five people outside a mosque in Gombe.

February 2 - A female suicide bomber attacks minutes after the President of Nigeria leaves an election rally in the city of Gombe resulting in at least one death and eighteen people injured.

February 4 - Boko Haram militants reportedly raid the Cameroonian town of Fotokol in Cameroon's Far North Region with scores of people killed. The Chad Army claims to have killed 200 militants.
and lost nine soldiers while capturing the border town of Gamboru Ngala. February 6 - Boko Haram forces launch raids on the towns of Bosso and Diffa, both in Niger Republic, marking the first time that the group has attacked the country. The Chadian military assists the Nigerien Armed Forces in repelling the attack. 5 Nigeriens are killed while the government claims 109 Boko Haram militants are killed as well.

February 7 - Nigeria postpones its general election for six weeks to allow its armed forces to control parts of the country currently controlled by Boko Haram.

See table 10 below an outline of selected Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria between 2009 and 2015.

**Table 10: Selected Incidents of Boko Haram Attacks (2009 - 2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Nature of Attacks</th>
<th>Remark(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>July 26, 2009</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>5 days uprising and attack on the police station that spread to Maidu gru in Borno State as well as Yobe and Kano States</td>
<td>Over 800 people killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>July 27, 2009</td>
<td>Potiskum</td>
<td>Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters</td>
<td>3 policemen and 1 fire service officer died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>March 13, 2010</td>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>Churches and Markets</td>
<td>300 people killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sept 7, 2010</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Attacked prisons</td>
<td>Killed 5 guards and freed 700 inmates, including former sect members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Oct. 1, 2010</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Explosions Near The Eagle Square</td>
<td>12 people killed and many more injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Incident Type</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Oct 11, 2010</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Bombing/Gun attack on a police station</td>
<td>Destroys station and injures 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dec 24, 2010</td>
<td>Barkin Ladi</td>
<td>Bomb Attack</td>
<td>8 people killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dec 28, 2010</td>
<td>Jos</td>
<td>Bomb attack on a church</td>
<td>38 people killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dec 31, 2010</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Attack on Mammy market at Army Mogadishu barracks</td>
<td>11 people killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Jan 21, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Attack on politicians</td>
<td>8 persons killed including ANPP governorship candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>March 2, 2011</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>The residence of Divisional Police Officer</td>
<td>Two policemen killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>March 30, 2011</td>
<td>Damaturu</td>
<td>Bomb Attack</td>
<td>Injured a police officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>April 8, 2011</td>
<td>Suleja</td>
<td>Bombing of INEC Office</td>
<td>8 corps members killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>April 9, 2011</td>
<td>Unguwar Doki, Maiduguri</td>
<td>Bomb explosion at polling unit</td>
<td>17 persons killed and many more injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>April 29, 2011</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Bombing of Army barracks</td>
<td>No death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>May 29, 2011</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Explosion at Mammy market of Shandawanka barracks</td>
<td>Claimed 18 lives, leaving many other injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>May 30, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Early morning bomb explosion on Baga road</td>
<td>13 persons died and many more injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>June 7, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Series of bomb blasts</td>
<td>Claimed 5 lives with many more injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>June 16, 2011</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Bombing of Nigerian Police Headquarters</td>
<td>3 killed with many vehicles destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>June 16, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Bomb blast at Damboza barracks</td>
<td>4 children killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>June 20, 2011</td>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>Boko Haram storms Kankara police station</td>
<td>9 policemen killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Clash between Boko Haram and Military</td>
<td>31 persons killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11, 2011</td>
<td>Kaduna</td>
<td>Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint on Fokados street</td>
<td>Many people killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 12, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Boko Haram throws explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle</td>
<td>5 persons killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 15, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Explosion in Maiduguri</td>
<td>5 persons injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Explosion close to the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garba Elkanem</td>
<td>3 soldiers injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Bomb explosion near the palace of a traditional ruler</td>
<td>8 persons are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 25, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Bank robbery</td>
<td>4 policemen, 1 soldier and 7 civilians are killed. Undisclosed amount of money stolen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 26, 2011</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>A Suicide bomber drove into the United Nations building</td>
<td>25 killed and 60 injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 12, 2011</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Bomb attack on a police station in Misau</td>
<td>7 people including 4 policemen are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 31, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Armed attack on military vehicle</td>
<td>4 soldiers are injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 3, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Attack on Baga market</td>
<td>3 people killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 4, 2011</td>
<td>Damaturu</td>
<td>Attacks on Damaturu villages</td>
<td>150 persons killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 24, 2011</td>
<td>Jos</td>
<td>Bomb attacks on churches and markets</td>
<td>80 persons killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 25, 2011</td>
<td>Madalla</td>
<td>Christmas Day bomb attack on Church</td>
<td>50 persons killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 30, 2011</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Bomb attacks</td>
<td>7 people are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 5, 2012</td>
<td>Gombe</td>
<td>Bomb attacks on a church</td>
<td>6 people are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 6, 2012</td>
<td>Yola; Mubi</td>
<td>Bomb attacks on Christ Apostolic Church</td>
<td>17 people are killed in Yola; 20 Igbos killed in Mubi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 20, 2012</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Multiple Bomb attacks</td>
<td>250 persons killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 22, 2012</td>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>Attacks on churches and the Headquarters of Balewa LGA</td>
<td>Two churches are destroyed, two soldiers, a DPO, and 8 civilians are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 10, 2012</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Attack on Police station in Shagari quarters</td>
<td>Many injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 15, 2012</td>
<td>Koton Karji</td>
<td>Caused Jailbreak in Koton Karji</td>
<td>A warder is killed and 199 inmates released</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26, 2012</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Bombing of 3 media houses</td>
<td>8 people are killed and several injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 2012</td>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>Attack on Bayero University</td>
<td>13 Christian worshippers, senior non-academic staff and two professors are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30, 2012</td>
<td>Jalingo</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>11 persons are killed and several injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 12, 2013</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Bomb, Gun attack on Mosque</td>
<td>56 persons are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 20, 2013</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
<td>Shootout with security operatives</td>
<td>79 persons killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 29, 2013</td>
<td>Gujba</td>
<td>Gun Attack on Gujba College</td>
<td>Over 50 students are killed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 10, 2013</td>
<td>Damboa</td>
<td>Gun Attack on Damboa</td>
<td>20 killed (15 suspected militants and 5 civilians)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 29, 2013</td>
<td>Damaturu</td>
<td>Raid on Damaturu</td>
<td>128 people are killed (95 militants, 23 soldiers, 8 policemen, and 2 civilians)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>May 20, 2014</td>
<td>Jos</td>
<td>Car bombs in the city of Jos</td>
<td>118 villagers are killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>May 27, 2014</td>
<td>Potiskum</td>
<td>Attack on Military base</td>
<td>49 security personnel and 9 civilians are killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>May 30, 2014</td>
<td>Gwoza</td>
<td>Ambush, assassination of 3rd emir of Gwoza, Idrissa Timta, is assassinated during a Boko Haram ambush</td>
<td>Emir of Gwoza is killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>June 1, 2014</td>
<td>Mubi</td>
<td>Bomb Attack</td>
<td>40 persons killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>June 2, 2014</td>
<td>Borno Villages</td>
<td>Random attacks on several villages</td>
<td>Over 200 people are killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Jan 3-7, 2015</td>
<td>Baga</td>
<td>Boko Haram militants raze the entire town of Baga.</td>
<td>2,000 people having been killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Jan 5, 2015</td>
<td>Baga</td>
<td>Massacre in Baga</td>
<td>Several killed, thousands flee Baga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Jan 10, 2015</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Suicide attack on market by 10-year-old female bomber</td>
<td>Bomber and 19 others are killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Jan 24, 2015</td>
<td>Kambari</td>
<td>Boko Haram gunmen attempt to burn down the village of Kambari</td>
<td>15 people are killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Jan 25, 2015</td>
<td>Maiduguri</td>
<td>Attempt to overrun Maiduguri repelled by Military</td>
<td>8 civilians, 53 terrorists killed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eze (2013); compilations from wikipedia.org
PICTURES OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram Leader, Abubakar Shekau

Boko Haram Fighters on Display

Boko Haram Leader, Mohammed Yusuf, Killed in Police Custody

Abubakar Shekau and other Boko Haram Fighters

Chibok School Girls Abducted by Boko Haram
PICTURES OF VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY BOKO HARAM

WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD?
The purpose of this inaugural lecture is to unveil the real terrorists in Nigeria. The facts and arguments presented in this paper show that the State or government is the main actor in terrorism in our society. What government does, how it governs, its actions and inactions, will promote or curtail terrorism by groups or organizations outside government. We outlined the causes of terrorism and identified
corruption, impunity, poverty and unemployment, political domination and economic marginalization as key variables which instigate terrorism in Nigeria.

This paper has explained the character of the State and politics in Nigeria, and analyzed how we got to where we are - both in the Niger Delta region and the North-East region of Nigeria. The question is: how do we move from here? What is the way forward? Combating terrorism involves two sets of actions to: (a) to oppose terrorism and (b) to transcend terrorism. The measures to oppose terrorism are preferred by governments and international institutions. This involves two approaches: anti-terrorism (defensive measures) and counter terrorism (offensive measures).

1. Antiterrorism is defined as defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorists acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Increasingly, terror-prone States have changed their policy to more “offensive approach” that focuses on the “source of violence”, that is, the terrorists themselves and those who harbor them.

2. Counterterrorism involves those offensive measures taken to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.
   a. Counterterrorism programmes are classified and addressed in various national security decision directives and contingency plans.

**Objective of Combating Terrorism**
The general objective of combating terrorism programmes is neutralizing terrorist groups – rendering the threat source benign, not necessarily killing the terrorists.

   a. Antiterrorism objective can further be refined as preventing attacks and minimizing effects if one should occur. It includes any action to weaken the terrorist organization and its political power and to make potential targets more difficult to attack.

   b. Counterterrorism objective includes spoiling action, deterrence and response.


**Transcending Terrorism**
The measures to transcend terrorism are two-fold: short term and long term. In the short term, the government should embark on aggressive development of basic infrastructure to improve the wellbeing of the citizens and reduce poverty and unemployment in the most terror endemic regions. This should include road infrastructure, electricity, health facilities, education, potable water, environmental protection and rehabilitation programmes.

The main aim is to deny terrorists and militants the geo-political space to operate and make it difficult for them to find a foot hole among the people. Success with the provisions of key development projects will make it difficult for terrorists to find justification to claim “freedom fighter” status.

Equally important, is the compelling need to engage in counter ideological warfare; this is a battle for the hearts and minds of the youths – the reserve army of the unemployed and adventurous young adults. Terrorist groups presently rely on online videos, internet, the print and electronic media as channels for recruitment and propagation of extremist ideology. The nations of the world and mainstream religions must respond strategically with a counter ideology of peace, democracy, development, freedom and brotherhood of mankind. Beyond Anti-terrorism and Counter-terrorism, is the need for a strong and organized Counter ideology to recapture the hearts and minds of people who are sympathetic to terrorist groups. The success of the ideological war on terrorism is structurally linked to the success of delivering the dividends of democracy and good governance.

The State can win the war against terrorism. But it will be a pyric victory if it does not win the ideological war, which must be anchored on the existential realities of the people, especially the younger generation. The entire society must be carried along beginning with the restoration of good family values, respect for moral standards in public conduct and obedience to the rule of law.
The causal model below explains the intricate links to achieving a more enduring solution to terrorism. Beyond counter-terrorism, we can only transcend terrorism. Beyond counter-terrorism, we can only transcend terrorism through good governance which has the best potential to deny terrorists the supportive community, a legitimizing ideology and the army of alienated, marginalized and frustrated individuals. See figure 1 below.

**Figure 1: Model of Terrorism Causal Factors**

In the long term, the process of transcending terrorism would require the transformation of the Nigerian State through the process of deepening the culture of democracy, transparency, accountability
and obedience to the rule of law. The process of democratization cannot be totally indifferent to the character of the State. Without reforming the State, elections in Nigeria can only give the voter or citizen a choice between oppressors. In the absence of the rule of law and transparency, and a weak justice system, the coercive institutions of the State will remain above the law.

The long term solution to terrorism is the practice of popular democratic empowerment which addresses social and economic justice, and offers concrete political rights. The present liberal “electoral” democracy in Nigeria focuses on multi-party elections without any guarantees for “good governance”. As Ake (1996:7) asked: what is the point of choosing “democratically” those who will control a State apparatus which is inherently undemocratic? It amounts to a contradiction par excellence.

The alternative is social democracy which is driven by the interest of ordinary people. Only then can the “State system” incarnate our collective identity. Social democracy makes government more accountable and less corruptible, and brings public policy more in alignment with social needs.
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
One of the benefits of an inaugural lecture is to give the lecturer the opportunity and privilege of relating his area of specialization and his contributions therein to the betterment of society.

Vice Chancellor Sir, as a professor, I work in the “knowledge industry” to impart ideas, transfer knowledge and to contribute to human capital development in our society. I have over 70 publications to my credit, inclusive of books and articles in referred national and international journals.

- I have produced thousands of B.Sc degree graduates, dozens of Masters and PhD graduates, some of whom are now Senior Lecturers in Nigerian universities, including the University of Port Harcourt. Many more are in leadership positions in public service and the private sector.
- Political Scientists generally do not run for public office, but very often their expertise is enlisted for public policy and strategic studies. Some became political commentators on radio and television, and Newspaper Columnists. Mr Vice Chancellor sir, I have done all of these.
- In 1994, the Centre for Democratic Studies, Abuja conducted a nationwide debate and submission of papers for constitutional reform of the party system in Nigeria. My paper titled “Political Parties in the New Constitution” was selected and published by the Centre in the “Nigerian Journal of Democracy”. In it, I recommended the adoption of a two-party system as the most appropriate electoral system which can reduce the number and intensity of political cleavages by encouraging the formation of broad-based coalitions. This would allow for greater political sensitization, appeal to a wider inter-religious mass based social audience beyond the ethnic constituency and move the democratic process slowly but surely towards “issue-based” politics.

Twenty years later, I am glad to observe that this is now the political imperative in Nigeria.
In 2014, I led a team of Researchers to conduct a British Council sponsored study on the Post Amnesty programme in the Niger Delta. The outcome of the study will be useful to governments, aid/donor agencies and civil society organizations in the collective effort to achieve enduring peace and development in the Niger Delta.
CONCLUSION
Terrorism occurs in diverse and divergent social, political and economic conditions, and needs to be viewed through historical, cultural, economic, social and political lenses. Terrorist acts, culture and motivation may differ among groups and individuals, within and between religious and ethnic communities. Given this reality, if one takes a simplistic view of the causes and contexts of terrorism, one is likely to be led into a simplistic and narrow view of the solutions to terrorism.

If we recognize that one man’s “terrorist” could be another man’s “freedom fighter”, then we are more likely to consider “terrorism-specific” short term and long term response measures that are specific to regions, national and global contexts.

Today, the greatest danger confronting the world comes from failed States which create the fertile grounds for the emergence and growth of terrorism. The major features of such States are corruption and bad governance. Terrorism in Nigeria has its historical roots. Its effects and intensity varies from one region to another.

Nigeria must use its enormous natural resources and God given wealth to give its citizens good governance, accountable and transparent leadership based on equity and social justice. To act otherwise is to reinforce the terrorist threat in the north-east region and jeopardize the peace of the graveyard in other regions of the nation.
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Vice-Chancellor Sir, I have the pleasure to read, at this Inaugural Lecture today, the citation on my friend, a consummate scholar and forthright gentleman of many parts.

Professor Henry Ezika Alapiki was born on 16th July 1960 to late Chief Ernest Gaga Alapiki and Late Mrs Mercy Alapiki of Akinima Town in Engenni Clan of Ahoada West LGA of Rivers State. Professor Alapiki had his primary education at Akinima State School, Akinima (1965-1972). His primary education suffered a 2-year disruption occasioned by the Nigerian civil war.

In 1973, he enrolled at Stella Maris College, Port Harcourt and completed his secondary school education in 1978. He worked briefly for a year as a clerical officer at the Ministry of Information and Social Welfare, Port Harcourt, Rivers State before proceeding to the University of Port Harcourt, Choba to pursue a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) programme in 1979.

He graduated in 1983 and proceeded to higher degree programme to acquire a Master of Science (M.Sc.) Degree in Development Studies (1986), Post Graduate Diploma in Education (PGDE) Degree (1987) and Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Degree in Political Theory (1996) from the University of Port Harcourt.
He was employed as a Government Teacher at the University Demonstration Secondary School (1985-1990) where he also served as Secretary of Parents-Teachers Association (PTA) and staff representative on the Board of Governors of the school. In 1991, he was appointed Assistant Lecturer at the Department of Political Science of the University of Port Harcourt. He rose to the rank of Associate Professor in 2005 and finally became a Professor of Political Science in 2010.

Professor Alapiki was a Fulbright Scholar at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, USA in 2002. He was also the Team Leader for a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) organised training programme for Elected Local Government Officials in South-East and South-South Region in 1999. He was a Research Associate in a World Bank sponsored Research on “Dynamics of Secondary Education Sector Study in Nigeria in 2004.

In University Administration, Professor Alapiki was twice the Head of Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt, 2008-2010, and 2010-2012. He is currently serving a second tenure as Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Port Harcourt: 2012 to present.

His other appointments in national service include: Member, Governing Council, Rivers State University of Science and Technology (RSUST) 2002-2004; INEC Returning Officer, State Assembly Elections 1999, INEC Returning Officer, National Assembly Elections 2003 (Rivers West Senatorial Zone); Federal Board Member, Forestry Institute of Nigeria (FRIN) 2009 – 2011.

Professor Alapiki is a member of the following Professional Associations: Member, International Political Science Association (IPSA); Member American Political Science Association (APSA); Member, Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA); Member, Social Science Council of Nigeria (SSCN). Our distinguished Inaugural Lecturer has successfully supervised dozens of Masters’ Degree and PhD Research Project candidates. He has served as external assessor for Professorship for Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Benson Idahosa University, Osun State University and Veritas University, Abuja. He is also an external examiner to Niger Delta University, Amassoma, University of Uyo and Rivers State University of Education, Rumuolumeni, Port Harcourt.
Professor Alapiki has over seventy (70) publications and articles in referred national and international journals, single authored and edited books. He is the chief editor of Journal of Nigerian Affairs. Some of his publications, which are topical include: “The State, Oil Resource Conflicts and the Niger Delta Question” (2008); “Pollution and the Oil Industry; The Nigerian Experience” (1998); “New Directions in the Management of the Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria” (2000); “Environmental Degradation and Social Conflicts in the Niger Delta Area of Nigeria” (2000); The Gas Industry and Environmental Hazards in the Niger Delta” (2003), and “Development Commissions and the Oil Producing Communities of Nigeria: A Review of OMPADEC and NDDC” (2006).

Professor Alapiki has served as Guest Speaker at Osun State University Public Lecture (2012), Guest Lecturer (Keynote Address), Niger Delta First-Class Monarchs Annual Conference, Calabar 2013; Guest Lecturer (Keynote Address), 2014 Rivers State Civil Service Week, Port Harcourt.

Professor Alapiki is a titled chief, Adidediriga 1 of Akinima Town. He is a priest and member of Eckankar. In April 2014, Professor Alapiki was appointed the National President of ECKANKAR Nigeria, Religion of the Light and Sound of God.

We can go on and on about our Inaugural Lecturer, who is a man of many parts. I must resist the temptation to say more. Vice-Chancellor sir, it is my singular honour and privilege to present to you a gentleman, a friend of all, a man of God, a university administrator and versatile Dean, a community leader and chief, a fulbrighter and social analyst, to present the 117th Inaugural Lecture titled: “The State and the Culture of Terrorism in Nigeria: Unveiling the Real Terrorists.

Professor Henry Ezika Alapiki, please speak to us.

Professor Mrs Victory Dienye